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Abstract 
Producers and marketers of agricultural commodities are often beset with a similar 
set of problems that generally may be reduced to the following question:  "how can we 
modify our product or program in such a way as to gain a competitive edge on our 
competition?"  As every commodity marketer knows, there is, unfortunately, no easy 
answer to this question. Obtaining higher prices and returns for agricultural products is 
possible, but requires commitment, vision and attention to the ever-changing marketplace. 
The current monograph contains two case studies that approach this perennial 
question from different agricultural commodity industries--fresh produce and turkeys--that 
are surrounded by different sets of basic supply and demand conditions. Yet, in each case, 
the companies depicted have been particularly aggressive in their approach to marketing and 
at least moderately successful in their quest for higher producer returns. 
Both of these cases are based on real companies and current data. In the first 
instance, TruFresh International (TFI) has been substituted for the company's actual name 
but the circumstances documented in the case have not been altered, and in the second 
example, Plainville Turkey Farm (PTF)  is indeed the name of the firm. The story of each 
is instructive in a different way. 
Simply put, TFI, long an innovator in fresh produce marketing, is confronted with 
the challenge that several of its competitors are beginning to duplicate certain of its most 
successful product and market innovations. The case focuses on the strategic alternatives 
that TFI may have at its disposal to address this problem, typical to so many commodity 
industries. 
In the second instance, PTF is faced with a related but narrower issue:  the PTF 
brand of fresh turkey products has been received enthusiastically in Central New York 
State as a high quality brand and one for which consumers have demonstrated a willingness 
to pay a premium. The dilemma for PTF is whether, and with what strategy, should it 
attempt to expand its well established branded line of turkey products to new regions and 
new markets? 
Both of these firms are confronted with a set of marketing challenges that will 
sound familiar to nearly all commodity-based companies. In discussing the events that led 
to the situations faced by these two companies and the strategic options available to address 
them, students, executives and industry practitioners will gain an improved understanding 
of the process involved in adding value to differentiate agricultural commodities. 
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Both case studies contained within this monograph are accompanied by a "Teaching 
Note" to assist in understanding possible strategies either firm might pursue. 
The TruFresh International Case is intended to be brief, with the major focus on 
past strategies and subsequent actions employed by the firm. It is perhaps best suited as a 
teaching vehicle to generate discussion and inquiry into general strategies a commodity 
producer might consider to strengthen it's competitive position within the marketplace. 
The Plainville Turkey Farm Case is more detailed and contains a brief overview of 
the turkey industry at the national level. It is instructional by itself; providing the reader 
with an overview of the turkey industry and a glimpse of how one producer grew a highly 
successful regional company. Like the TruFresh ·Case, it's focus is on strengthening it's 
competitive position within the industry, however, more specifically, it addresses the issue 
of branding. 
With both cases, working either as individuals or in groups, students can be asked 
to prepare reports, regarding what they recommend as the appropriate strategic steps, what 
data are needed, and what further opportunities lie ahead. 
Of course, before distributing the case to students, the "Teaching Notes" should be 
detached to be distributed later according to the style of the instructor. Anyone with 
questions about usage is encouraged to contact us at Cornell University, (607) 255-1588. 
4 TruFresh  International 
"Consumer change leads to marketing res}X)nse."  While this marketing adage has 
always held true, at no time has consumer change taken place as rapidly as it did during the 
1980s.  Major shifts in consumer demographic and lifestyle patterns gave rise to exciting 
new  op}X)rtunities for some businesses and to substantial downturns for others. In the U. 
S. food system, producers and markets of certain traditional foods, red meats and eggs, for 
example, faced difficult strategic decisions as they witnessed precipitous declines in sales 
as a result inler alia of consumers' new concerns with the nutrition and healthfulness of 
foods. These same trends, however, have resulted in strong sales growth in certain other 
industries, such as fresh produce. But growth leads to different kinds of strategic 
problems. 
A  Story of Growth 
TruFresh International (TA) was founded in 1976 by three business colleagues, all 
born into long time California agricultural families. Their vision was to create a company 
that would extend beyond the time-honored model of produce packing houses as 
"commodity" sellers. "Stretch" Lawson, one of the founders, often remarked in those early 
years that, "the saddest thing about this industry is that only one thing distinguishes one 
produce packer from another--price." 
TruFresh saw diversification and new products as the key ingredients needed to 
break out of the commodity mold. Almost immediately, TA began to acquire other 
companies, additional packer labels and new technology. In 1978, TA became the first 
company to aggressively market the Red Harne Seedless grape, developed by scientists at 
the University of California at Davis. The Red Harne became an overnight marketplace 
success and was to become the first of many more convenient, better tasting produce items 
the TR would introduce. 
The new resolve to develop new products at TR was strengthened when the onset 
of the 1980s gave rise to a set of problems that few in agriculture had foreseen. Many crops 
across the United States, especially in California, had been drastically overplanted due to 
the favorable tax treatment given agricultural developments by previous tax laws coupled 
with over-optimistic demand forecasts. The resulting abundant supplies created an 
industry-wide climate of lower fresh fruit and vegetable prices, driving TA to intensify its 
efforts to differentiate itself from its competitors. Rick Conrad, Senior Vice President.of 
Marketing, remembers this era: "We saw it becoming more clearly evident that to be 
successful, we had to be different, and being different meant developing patented or 
proprietary commodities that others didn't have." 
However, not all of Conrad's industry colleagues shared this conviction. In fact, 
the fresh produce industry was of two op}X)sing minds regarding its endorsement of the so-
called "marketing orientation." New products, were believed by certain top managers, like 
Conrad, to be the key to a leadership }X)sition in the produce industry for a number of . 
reasons. Most critical, consumers and retail customers demanded it. By the early 1980s, 
the number of fresh offerings in the average supermarket produce department had more 
than doubled from the 1975 average of about 65 items. Consumers were increasingly 
looking to the produce department for mealtime excitement:  it fit their new health, diet-
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minded lifestyles and increasingly represented exotic places from around the world. 
Naturally, retail produce directors, anxious to capitalize on new consumer interest, began 
searching "all comers of the globe" in attempts to continue the fresh produce expansion. 
What's more, these managers suspected that, like in packaged goods marketing, 
new product "introductions" in produce offered the possibility of converting the value or 
"equity" already established by a finn's past record into new areas of opportunity and 
profit. 
However, to cover the costs required to develop such distinctive new products, 
"special status" for their products would have to be established, in other words, brands. 
Yet the corollary to brands was that premium prices would have to be charged.  It was this 
issue that divided industry leaders into two camps. The other faction of the industry, 
including several prominent industry spokesmen, argued that the requisites for brands--
consistency, stable pricing, national.promotion and advertising, research and development 
spending, and true differentiation--did not, and could not, exist in the fresh produce 
industry. As one of them commented, "It's suicide. In commodity industries, "brands" are 
a contradiction in tenns."  Indeed, even the advocates within the industry understood that 
with few exceptions, "brands" was an alien concept in fresh produce and realized that 
following a branded strategy meant walking a high wire. 
Nevertheless, in the early 80s, the "brands" proponents prevailed in several 
progressive finns. TFI embarked on an aggressive campaign to develop and acquire new 
products.  In 1983, TFI introduced its first branded product in the specialty produce 
category when it obtained exclusive rights to market a brilliant, flaming red, sweet pepper. 
It was followed by an exclusive tomato in 1986, a carefully bred, vine-ripened succulent 
tomato with an extended shelf life when compared to ordinary tomatoes. In 1990, after 
more intensive hybrid improvement, a new version of this tomato was introduced to the 
nation's produce departments. By 1990, TFI also had proprietary rights to produce or 
market a growing number of other specialties as well:  exotic citrus products, multi-colored 
peppers and seedless watennelons and grapes. 
Problems  Along  the  Way  ••• Some  Responses 
As the early nay-sayers had warned, the differentiation approach followed by TFI 
during the 1980s was fraught with problems. A number of weather incidents in California 
nearly devastated supplies of several of TFI's most important crops, making service and 
pricing levels committed to earlier nearly impossible to maintain. Fortunately, in many of 
these instances, total disaster was averted, by the extensions of seasons from contra-
seasonal production areas, often from Mexico or South America, where TFI had engaged 
in numerous joint venture arrangements with various producers. Such geographic 
diversity, offering multiple areas of supply, was a key factor permitting TFI to be a year-
round supplier. 
Capital availability, too, was a constraint. The new product credo that some at TFI 
. were preaching was modeled directly on the experience of many of the large grocery 
manufacturers and, as such, relied heavily on research and development and advertising 
spending. In less than two years at the end of the 19808, Proctor and Gamble alone had 
spent $1.5 billion to launch its new "Ultra-Pamper" diaper, these moneys being allocated to 
R&D as well as advertising and promotion. Although this outrageous amount was an 
exception, it was true that the large grocery manufacturers routinely spent $20 to $40 
million to introduce a new product. These enonnous sums, many at TFI pointed out, were 
simply prohibitive for the relatively meager resources of a produce company. 
6 I  TruFresh International  Case Sludyl 
At the same time, it was argued by some that innovation can take place for less than 
$1.5 billion. In 1989, TFI acquired Super Fresh Farming Company, a major grower and 
marketer of special patented table grapes and treefruit located in the San Joaquin and 
Coachella Valleys. The acquisition included one of the world's largest fruit-breeding 
laboratories, a certified pesticide residue testing center and a professional staff of 22 
technicians and scientists. By the early 1990s, TFI spent about $2.5 million yearly in 
research, much of it at its Super Fresh Laboratory Facility. It  experimented, for example, 
with 90,000 table grape and 40,000 stone fruit crosses a year. Such research activity was 
required for TFI to reach its ambitious goals in the marketplace: extended seasons, early 
and late;  easier handling products; and improved flavor. 
Yet, of all the goals, Joseph Ferrell, TFI's chairman and CEO, believed that taste 
was the most critical:  "  ... the consumer isn't interested in production problems. If the 
product doesn't taste good, regardless of how difficult it was to produce, the consumer will 
not buy it." 
Another crucial but largely unresolved issue at TR was how to handle advertising 
and promotion. Borrowing from the experience of the grocery manufacturers again seemed 
inappropriate: budgets to advertise to the consumer mass market using national broadcast 
media seemed clearly out of the question. Yet some at TR wondered: was not such 
continuous exposure required to engender the consumer recognition upon which brands 
rely? Although a number of "push" and "pull" promotional techniques were tested, neither 
faction of the TR management could decide the optimal course of action. 
Positioning  for  the  1990s 
TFI's progress during its first 15 years was made in fits and starts;  the problems, 
some predicted some unforeseen, inherent in bringing a commodity based industry into the 
era of marketing were not inconsequential. Nevertheless, in an industry where steep year-
to-year sales and earnings variations were accepted as an inevitable fact of doing business, 
TFI's sales growth spoke for itself (Table 1): 











Executives at TFI regarded the impressive record of sales growth as strong 
indication that they were indeed following the right path--perhaps the marketing orientation 
would work out despite the misgivings of certain industry critics. What other conclusion to 
draw?  Although reliable market share data were unavailable, industry estimates suggested 
that TFI's share of business was also growing. 
Throughout this period of healthy industry debate--not, incidentally restricted to just 
the fresh produce industry--over proper interpretation of market conditions and the best 
strategic course to follow rarely was there agreement on any particularly issue, until the 
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early 1990s: virtually every produce company expected the increase in competition during 
the 1990s to be fierce. 
New competition was already changing the rules of the game. The proprietary and 
patented varieties that TFI had worked so long to perfect were being copied, and with 
considerable success. Relatively nameless packers were now selling credible imitations of 
some of TFI's proudest items: the multi-colored peppers, the seedless grape and 
watermelons and the vine-ripened tomato. A rule of thumb that hold in most industries is 
that imitators can make a new product for two-thirds of the cost and time that it takes the 
innovating firm. This reality coupled with their very low marketing budgets enabled the 
imitators to undercut TFI's premium "branded" prices. TFI felt cheated.  After all, it was 
they who developed the niche, who built the business of branded specialties and now some 
"crossroads packer" was stealing the show. There were some who pointed out that TFI had 
taken great  (too much?) satisfaction in having boosted the commodity produce business 
into the era of branded marketing only to now watch it decline into a game of one generic 
item chasing another. 
Moreover, other threats loomed just over the horizon. As the so-called sophisticated 
packaged grocery marketers developed their own five year plans in the late 80s and early 
90s, their market research told them the thing that TruFresh already knew:  consumers 
wanted more fresh food, less packaged food and, even worse from their perspectives, 
retailers were responding to meet these new consumer desires. Retail fresh food 
departments were everywhere being expanded, at the expense of the traditional stronghold 
of the branded manufacturers, the dry grocery aisles. Not surprisingly, then, many of these 
manufacturers whose historical sales had been limited to packaged groceries were 
beginning to make major commitments to fresh foods. Experiments were appearing 
everywhere with familiar household names and other large companies without previous 
fresh produce background who were beginning to look for "greener" pastures for the 90s: 
Pillsbury, Birds-Eye, Cargill, and Carnation came to mind. 
Many observers at TFI took solace in the fact that many of these early trial balloons did not 
fly very high. "They'll learn that the fresh produce business is a lot more complex than the 
assembly line of dry groceries" was a common attitude. They remembered with vengeful 
satisfaction the experience of Tennaco Oil, Campbell Soup, and Nestle. Others, however, 
were concerned. What could happen to the produce industry if even a few of these major 
food industry players, with their deep pockets for advertising and R&D expenditures, 
began to put some of their marketing and technical expertise to work in fresh produce? 
Moreover, it was common industry knowledge that while many of the initial forays of these 
manufacturing companies into fresh foods had not prcxluced immediate success, nearly all 
of them had made a public commitment to enter the industry in the long run. 
As TFI managers prepared for their upcoming Sales and Marketing Meeting, 
scheduled for February 1993, they were worried. Should they continue to spend heavily on 
innovation?  Should they adopt an aggressive or a defensive strategy? Or, more basically, 
how should they position their company for the 1990s in such a way as to enhance their 
demonstrated industry leadership? Quite a list of problems and questions remained 
unanswered. 
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Summary 
The TR case describes a set of conditions that is recognizable in many, if not most, 
commodity-based industries. Perhaps the single feature of the TR firm that distinguishes it 
from many of its competitors is that it has a long history of taking steps to differentiate 
itself and its products from the vagaries of commodity markets. TR began to "add-value" 
to its product/service package twenty years ago and has continued in that tradition until 
today. In so doing, TR has established its company as one of the true leaders in the 
produce industry not just in terms of innovation but also in terms of sales and profitability. 
Approach  to  Case  Discussion 
This case lends itself particularly well to discussing the marketing challenges of a 
fresh produce producer and/or marketer but the issues range much broader than just the 
produce industry and thus the case may also serve as a catalyst for discussion for any 
commodity-based industry. Although the points developed below are restricted for the most 
part to the produce industry, a discussion leader should have little difficulty expanding the 
scope of discussion to fit almost any commodity with the use of appropriate examples. 
To varying degrees, the following challenges are implied in the case, and should be 
addressed by any group attempting to describe the range of strategic options open to TFI, 
or any other produce operator wishing to differentiate i tself from "the crowd. " 
Strengthening  the  Competitive 
Position  of a  Commodity-Based  Marketer 
The first two of the strategies below are perhaps the most effective in both the short 
and the long-runs, but they have the considerable disadvantage that they often require the 
most resources and sophistication. 
• Develop new products and/or packages 
- specialty products (hydroponic vegetables, "baby" vegetables, organic 
products, etc.) 
- "value-added" products through technology (hybrids with better flavor, 
longer seasons, more disease resistant, better color, more consistent 
sizing, etc.) 
- more convenient packaging (e.g  ..  , microwavable) 
- more environmentally friendly packaging 
•  Undertake advertising and promotion efforts 
- national or regional consumer advertisements 
- trade ads--directed primarily at the retail buyer · 
- in-store promotional activity 
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•  Adopt cost reducing technology 
- packing and shipping technologies that improve quality and consistency, 
gets the product to the market faster, maintains freshness better, etc. 
•  Expand in size to gain market power 
- acquire another firm 
- merge with a larger firm 
- expand into additional commodities or additional geographic regions--to 
offer "one-stop shopping" 
•  Change products to fit changing market needs. Appeal to customers and 
consumers by staying abreast of their current and changing needs and 
preferences.  The following, for example, may fairly represent the "changing 
agenda" of today's consumers with respect to fresh produce: 
- nutrition  - convenience 
- taste, flavor, variety  - service 
- packaging  - quality and consistency 
- safety  - information/understanding 
- pri ce and val ue 
This list becomes the basis for the development of new products and new 
strategies. A similar list should be generated for wholesale/retail customers 
•  Develop means to coordinate with growers to obtain adequate supplies--optimum 
quality and consistency 
- form joint sales agency 
- consider various forms of cooperative activity, etc. 
- experiment with various forms of contracting 
•  Recognize that marketing and innovation is not a one-time application--it is a 
continuous process.  . 
- develop some system of "market research", however rudimentary. Plainville  Turkey  Farm 
Traveling down the rural roads of Plainville New York, it appears that this is a quiet 
farming village or perhaps a bedroom community to nearby Syracuse. Heading east down 
Plainville Road brings no surprises until over a knoll, a sprawling complex of neatly 
manicured buildings comes into view. Upon closer inspection, the passerby notices a feed 
mill, several barns and buildings, a visitor center and retail store. This is the home of 
Plainville Turkey Farm, the largest turkey producer in New York and New England. 
Today Steve, the marketing manager for Plainville is contemplating several 
marketing strategies for the firm. While considering many options, he can't help but ponder 
Plainville's long history. 
Early  History 
Now in it's sixth generation of operation, this family owned business began in 
1835 as a general farm with 72 acres. William Ward (the owner) raised such crops as com, 
oats, wheat, hay and potatoes. Cows, horses, hogs and sheep were also kept on the farm. 
In 1923, under the watchful eye of Harry Bitz and William Ward Jr.  they began growing 
turkeys commercially. By the late 1930's about 6,(X)() turkeys were raised a year. Although 
turkey production was growing, the farm still continued to be diversified, with such crops 
as peas, tobacco, potatoes, dry beans and cabbage. A small dairy herd was also maintained 
on the farm. When Harry and Mettas' son, Robert joined the business in 1952 they began 
to focus their energies on turkey production. 
Since then the farm has changed dramatically. Small scale production of a variety of 
crops and animals has given way to specialized production of turkeys and a variety of 
turkey products and services. By 1991, Plainville Turkey Farm produced and processed 
more than 450,000 turkeys.  The farm consists of over 800 acres, with 15 of the acres 
taken up by 30 turkey growing buildings. The remainder of the tillable land is planted in 
corn. 
Robert's son, Mark, became the 6th generation to operate the farm, joining the 
business in 1985. Today, the farm is known in New York State for its high quality turkey 
products. Plainville turkey can also be enjoyed in a turkey dinner at Plainville Fanns 
Restaurant or in a sandwich at Plainville's Turkey and More Restaurant located in a nearby 
mall. Plainville's stated philosophy helps the observer better understand the spirit of this 
family run business: 
"We believe that goals, positive mental attitude, teamwork, knowledge and hard 
work are the keys to great accomplishments. With this in mind, we seek to provide 
our customers with fresh, nutritious and delicious products and excellent service. 
Further, we seek to provide safe, rewarding and profitable employment for all 
employees. As we work together towards these ends, let integrity, workmanship, 
industry and friendliness be our hallmarks." 
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A  National  Perspective 
Production:  Past  and  Present 
The United States turkey industry has undergone enormous changes in the past SO 
years. During the 1940's and SO's small farming operations gave way to large scale 
technologically advanced enterprises. After the Second World War, turkey breeding began 
to move from being centered around individual farms to being centered around processing 
plants.  This shift towards  concentration around processing plants combined with 
significant technological advances in turkey production, resulted in industry-wide shifts in 
geographic distribution, organization and marketing patterns for the turkey industry. 
Turkey production became more efficient and more profitable which enticed small family 
companies  to become much larger, and large corporations to begin to invest in the turkey 
business. As a result of this restructuring, the turkey industry today shares many 
organizational features with the poUltry industry. Owner integrated and contract production 
units account for greater than 80 percent of all production.l 
Production costs related to turkey production are largely influenced by the cost of 
feed. Typically seventy percent of the cost of production is attributable to feed cost. 
Processing and distribution to markets add substantially to the cost of producing poUltry 
meat. The U. S. Department of Agriculture estimates that these functions add an additional 
16 cents per pound to the cost of production. Of this additional cost, approximately 29 
percent is attributable to labor, 16 percent to packaging and 24 percent to assembly and 
distribution. The remaining factors contributing to this cost include fixed costs and other 
miscellaneous items. 
Industry  Concentration 
Traditionally located in  the North Central states and California, the turkey industry 
has shifted in its locus of production. Today, the industry is concentrated in the South 
Atlantic, West North Central and Western states.2 The New England, Mid-Atlantic, and 
East North Central regions produce less than they consume, while the rest of the country 
produces a net surplus.3  The top ten producing states account for 81  percent of the turkeys 
grown nationally (Table 1).4 
.1Austic Richard E.  and Nesheim Malden G.,  Poultry Production, Thirteenth 
Edition. Lea and Febiger, 1990, p 8. 
2Lasley, Floyd; Henson, William; Jones, Harold.  The  U.  S.  Turkey industry. 
Washington, DC.,  U.S ...... Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, no. 
525, pI. 
3Ibid., #4. 
41992 Turkey Statistics, National Turkey Federation IPlainville Turkey Farm 
TABLE  1:  Top Ten Turkey Producing States* 
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Since 1980, the United States turkey industry has been dominated by several large 
finns. The top ten finns, for example,  have produced between 56 and 59 percent of all live 
turkeys produced nationally. Furthennore, in 1992, the top three companies, Butterball 
Turkey Co., Carolina Turkeys and Rocco Inc. produced over 25 percent of the turkey meat 
in the U.S. Much of this growth was attributable to a number of acquisitions by several of 
the top finns. In the last decade, some of the nation's largest food companies, including 
ConAgra, Sara Lee, Hormel, and Philip Morris's Oscar Mayer bought turkey companies, 
partly as a hedge against a decline in their red-meat operations. These big companies have 
valuable supermarket connections and marketing expertise that helped insure wider 
distribution of turkey. 5 
Industry  Growth 
During the 1980's the industry experienced rapid growth. Farm income grew by 36 
percent between 1983 to 1990.6  During that same period, there was a 65 percent increase 
in the number of turkeys produced. In 1960, approximately 20 percent of meats consumed 
in the U.S. were poultry. However, by 1987 more than 36 percent  of meat consumed by 
Americans was poultry. 7 This shift in consumption patterns largely resulted from a 
simultaneous decrease in pork and beef consumption accompanied by a dramatic increase in 
turkey consumption (Table 2) due to changing consumer preferences for meat. 
SIs a  Whopper in Turkey's Future?  New York Times, November 25, 1991. 
61990 Turkey Statistics, National Turkey Federation 
7Ibid., #1., p. 289. IPlainville Turkey Farm  Case Study I  14 
TABLE 2:  Per Capita Consumption of Red Meat, Pork, and Poultry, 1985-1992. 
Pounds per Capita 
Lamb 
Year  Beef  Pork  &  Mutton  Chicken  Turkey 
1985  79.2  51.88  1.45  52.06  11.6 
1986  78.83  48.99  1.40  53.19  12.9 
1987  73.85  49.17  1.34  56.33  14.7 
1988  72.64  52.46  1.40  56.43  15.7 
1989  69.30  52.00  1.46  58.65  16.6 
1990  67.80  49.80  1.50  61.10  17.6 
1991  67.30  50.40  1.50  64.00  18.0 
1992**  67.30  53.50  1.50  67.20  18.3 
**Estimated 
Source: 1992 Turkey Statistics, Prepared by National Turkey Federation 
Current Trends 
Over the past several years as a result of rising consumer and retailer interest, there 
has been a strong push towards fresh turkey among processors, with fresh turkeys now 
almost equaling frozen turkeys in the number processed annually (Table 3). According to 
Su.permarket News,  "Fresh turkeys are being promoted more, and their prices are edging 
closer to those of the frozen birds. As a result, fresh turkey volume is looking better than 
ever".8 
TABLE3: Pounds of Turkey Processed, 1985-1992. 
Year  Fresh  Frozen  Total  Fresh  % 
Million Pounds 
1985  1,037  1,763  2,800  37% 
1986  1,256  1,875  3,131  40% 
1987  1,559  2,158  3,717  42% 
1988  1,706  2,218  3,924  43% 
1989  1,970  2,204  4,174  47% 
1990  2,291  2,384  4,675  49% 
1991  2,120  2,532  4,652  46% 
1992*  2,252  2,538  4,790  47% 
* Esllmated 
Source: 1992 Turkey Statistics, National Turkey Federation 
In addition to the shift towards fresh turkey,  there was a move away from whole 
birds by the end of the 1980's. Retailers reported greater consumer interest in turkey breast 
and turkey roast as alternatives to large whole turkeys.9 According to Julien Den Tandt, 
Norbest Inc. president, "More and more, food will be purchased in a semi-prepared state 
that's in attractive, more shelf-stable packaging, is health-and-diet-oriented, easily/quickly 
8 Turkey's Fresh Course. Supermarket News,  10/21191, p4S. 
9Ibid. #3. IPlainville Turkey Farm  Case Study I  15 
prepared and is delicious tasting". 10 In addition, there was more emphasis on producing 
turkey cuts similar to those cuts found in beef and pork. 
By 1991,92 percent of all turkey was eaten at home.  Further, in the past,  nearly 
90 percent of turkey had been consumed during the fourth quarter of the year. By the 
1990's, however, only  35 to 40 percent of all turkey was consumed during this time of the 
year (Table 4). 
TABLE 4:  Per Capita Consumption of Turkey in Pounds by Quarters, 1984-1989. 
Quarter  Year 
QQunds  ~r  cagita 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
I  2.0  2.1  2.4  2.6  3.1  3.2 
II  2.2  2.3  2.5  3.0  3.5  3.5 
III  2.7  2.9  3.1  3.6  3.9  4.3 
IV  4.5  4.9  5.3  5.9  5.5  6.1 
Total  11.4  12.1  13.3  15.2  15.9  17.1 
Source: 1990 Turkey Statistics, National Turkey Federation, numbers rounded 
In 1991, turkey producers/processors were eyeing fast food restaurants as a 
potentially lucrative market. Several chains, including Burger King, McDonalds, and 
Wendy's were considering adding turkey to their menus. In a 1991 trade industry article, 
Thomas E. Howe, president of the Butterball Turkey Company stated, "We are talking to 
major [fast-food] chains", predicting that a major chain would begin testing a turkey burger 
within six months. 
Growth  Slows 
However, the rapid growth of the 1980's resulted in an oversupply, leaving 
growers with the lowest prices in recent history. Evidence of this continue to plague the 
industry into the early 1990's. During 1992, Swift Butterball and Louis Rich each closed a 
processing plant. Operating losses or low returns, slower growth in demand for turkey 
products and fewer "new" turkey products were sited as reasons for  the plant closings. 
Plainville  Today 
Plainville Turkey Farm is a privately held corporation with a non-union labor force 
of approximately 125 employees. Throughout most of the 1980's, Plainville has 
experienced a 8-10 percent rate of annual growth. During this same period, the number of 
turkeys produced almost tripled (Table 5) . The corporation is vertically integrated 
consisting of five divisions: 
Division 1:  Com Production, Feed Production, Turkey Production, 
Division 2: Processing 
Division 3: Marketing. 
Division 4:  Human Resources 
Division 5: Accounts/Office 
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TABLE 5:  Production Growth at Plainville Turkey Farm, 1980, 1985, 1990. 
1980  1985  1990 
Production (no. of 
turkeys)  140,000  225,000  425,000 
Pounds of liveweight turkey  2.52 million  4.05 million  7.65 million 
Product  Line 
In 1992, Plainville offered over 75 products, which they separate into three product 
categories ( Table 6). 
TABLE 6: A Partial List of Plainville's Product Line 
HOLIDAY 
Fresh whole turkeys 
Smoked whole turkeys 







Cooked turkey breast 








Annually, the greatest percentage of sales at Plainville are attributable to deli, fresh 
and holiday related products (Table 7). As might be expected, during the holiday season 
(Thanksgiving and Christmas), 90 percent of production is dedicated to whole turkeys. For 
the remainder of the year 90 percent of the turkeys grown are processed for value added 
turkey products. 
TABLE 7: Distribution of sales across categories. 
Retail Holiday Products 
Food Service Products 
Deli Products 
Fresh Brand Identified Products 
Fresh Bulk Turkey Products 









All Plainville fresh, uncooked products are 100 percent natural with no added oils, 
water, salt or preservatives. Every product that leaves the farm is distributed under the 
Plainville name and trademark.  Currently, no private label work is conducted at Plainville. 
Sales  Area  and  Distribution 
Plainville's market covers New York State from Watertown, east to Albany, south 
to Binghamton and west to Buffalo. Steve estimates that Plainville holds a 30-40 percent 
market share for fresh whole turkeys during Thanksgiving and a 10 percent share for both ~IP_w_i_nv_i_lk  __  T<_u~_k~ey~F  __  ann  _______________________________________  C_ru_eSludYI  17 
deli items and parts in the Syracuse market during the year. Plainville's primary 
competitors for both deli items and whole turkeys include: Butterball (ConAgra), Louis 
Rich (Kraft General Foods) and Bilmar (Sara Lee). During the period from 1985 to 1990, 
both Plainville and it's primary competitors experienced a great deal of growth, however, 
Plainville's growth was substantially higher, posting a 47 percent increase in the pounds of 
liveweight turkey produced annually  during the five year period (Table 8). 






Pounds  of Liveweight 



















Plainville products can be found in supermarkets and at a small retail outlet located 
on the farm, in food services establishments (restaurants, colleges and hospitals) and in 
two restaurants operated by Plainville. In the past, sales were about evenly split between 
food service and retail, however in recent years there has been a greater emphasis on retail 
sales (Table 9). Furthermore, when Plainville relied more on brokers, a greater proportion 
of sales are made directly to the retailer than in the past. Steve would like to see this trend 
continue because he believes the retail market provides more stability due to increased 
customer loyalty and subsequent demand for Plainville products.  ' 
The retail store located at the Plainville Visitors Center is not an outlet store, simply 
a retail store with an educational exhibit and petting zoo attached. The management at 
Plainville viewed the center as a way to bring the community to the farm. Since building the 
new visitor's center and retail store, on-farm sales of turkey and turkey products has 
increased between 10 and 20 percent. However, only 1 to 2 percent of Plainville's total 
retail sales come from the on-farm retail store. 
Steve's sales force consists of 2 outside sales people, 1 inside salesperson, the 
President and himself. He uses food service distributors for the food service segment of the 
business. 
TABLE 9:  Distribution of Sales as Plainville Turkey Farm, 1990. 
Direct to Retail Outlets 
Distributors to Retail Outlets 
TOT  AL  RETAIL SALES 
Direct to Food Service 
Distributors to Food Service 
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Promotion/Merchandising 
Steve, the marketing manager, is in charge of all marketing functions. His annual 
budget is 9-10 percent of sales from which all marketing related expenses are deducted 
(including payroll, trucking, advertising etc.). Steve has developed a general promotion 
program targeted towards the retail audience. It is based on setting price based on volume, 
"cents off" on advertised promotions and point of purchase (POP) displays. 
Additionally, Plainville currently participates in an instore couponing program. This 
program offers members of a frequent shoppers club discounts on selected products which 
are electronically discounted at the front register upon checking out. This has been a  very 
successful means of promoting new and/or specific products for Plainville. 
In the past, Steve has experimented with manufacturers coupons in weekly circulars 
as a way to get retailers to highlight specific Plainville products. However, he has decided 
against pursuing this strategy because he feels it is not cost effective. 
Steve is targeting the "high end" of the consumer market ( 25-54 years old, more 
than 12 years of education, average to above average income) by featuring "high" quality. 
To accomplish this, Plainville stresses the nutritional value of it's products by 1) using a 
minimal amount of additives and 2) supplying nutritional facts with all items. In addition, 
Plainville provides recipes which utilize several cuts of turkey. 
Steve's  Challenge:  The  Future 
After considering the past and current status of Plainville, Steve glances at a 
magazine article opened on his desk which describes the current challenges of marketing a 
brand name. He is also thinking about a recent conversation with a buyer from large 
supermarket chain who would like to purchase Plainville turkeys and turkey products to 
include in it's newly expanded private label program. 
These recent trends in branding have roused Steve's interest in the subject. As an 
MBA with a degree in Marketing, Steve ponders the pros and cons of branding strategy. 
Brand  Strategy 
Steve is familiar with the various branding strategies a manufacturer can employ 
and their purported benefits. He believes a manufacturer's brand allows the manufacturer to 
maintain control over the marketing strategy of a product line. This includes all decisions 
regarding promotion, pricing, and distribution. The management at Plainville believes this 
allows them to control their image thus differentiating themselves from their competition. 
Steve feels a Plainville brand offers several additional advantages: 
• Plainville's brand name and trademark provide legal protection for the unique 
product features which could otherwise be copied by competitors. 
• A brand name gives Plainville the opportunity to attract a loyal and profitable set 
of customers. 
• Good brand names help build corporate image for Plainville Turkey Farm. IPlainville Turkey Farm  Case Study I  19 
Steve is less familiar with  private label branding. He has observed that private label 
products seem to be lower priced than national brands and may provide the retailer with a 
higher profit margin; perhaps twice as high as their branded equivalents. Steve has heard 
that the major advantage of private label branding is that it appeals to budget conscious 
shoppers. He is also very cognizant of the fact that private label brands can undercut 
manufacturer brands such as his. 
Steve is very aware that many manufacturers engage in "mixed" branding. He has 
been against this strategy for Plainville. He feels that  as a tightly controlled family 
operation, entrance into private label operations would threaten Plainville brand loyalty and 
erode the control now exercised over the business. He feels secure with this strategy 
because of a strong demand for the Plainville name in current retail outlets. 
As Steve well knows, branding can be see on everything from services, to what 
was traditionally viewed as commodities, to virtually every product in the marketplace. 
However, recently he has read about some reversion towards non-branding. Generics, 
unbranded, plainly packaged and private label, less expensive versions of common national 
brands are growing in popUlarity. 
A recent magazine article he read said that according to The Private Label 
Manufacturers Association, "Store brands amounted to 18.2 percent of supermarket sales 
last year, compared with 17.7 percent in 1989. 11  Loyalty to national brands is dwindling. 
Three years ago, 56 percent of those polled by Roper Organization said they know what 
brand they want to buy when they enter a store. That figure fell  to 53 percent in April 1990 
and plunged to 46 percent in  1991.12 Today, consumers who were formally loyal to one 
brand are increasingly becoming "brand switchers". 
One explanation for this phenomenon is that retailers have been responding to 
consumer demands by providing them with exciting new lines and renewed emphasis on 
established store brands. Quality has been improved, packaging has been re-designed and 
product lines have been widened. 
Although Steve continues to believe that consumers are very loyal to the Plainville 
brand name, he's wondering how he can maintain this loyalty and brand recognition as 
Plainville heads towards the 21st century and considers future growth strategies. 
llA Tale of Two Brands. Supermarket News  10/28/91. p16. 
12Brands in trouble. Advertising Age  12/211991. p16. Teaching  Note 
to accompany 
Plainville  Turkey  Farm 
Summary 
The major issues which faced Plainville in this case study revolved around 
Plainville's branding strategy and how this would influence /impact future growth of the 
business.  Plainville utilized only it's own brand on all of it's products while nationally, the 
rest of the processors engaged in mixed brand strategies. 
Approach  to  Case  Discussion 
The PTF case lends itself very nicely to a discussion focused on whether, and with 
what strategy, it should attempt to expand it's well established branded line of turkey 
products to new regions and new markets. 
Although the PTF case focuses exclusively on the turkey industry, the discussion 
leader is encouraged to consider expanding the scope of this discussion to other 
commodities. 
The following discussion reviews PTF's competitive environment, various 
branding strategies and suggests several growth strategies which PTF might consider as it 
looks to the future. Any group studying the PTF case is encouraged to engage in a 
discussion which addresses these issues as it considers how PTF might continue it's long 
tradition of successful growth and expansion. 
Plainville's  Competitive  Environment 
On a national level, Plainville was a very small turkey grower/processor while 
regionally, it was the largest firm in the northeast. 
Competitive advantages: 
1. Regionally Plainville had name brand recognition, and people were familiar with 
the firm. 
2. Plainville products could be found in a number of retail outlets in the market 
area. 
3. Product line was deep while offering the highest quality products possible. 
4. Plainville features fresh products which are gaining consumer popUlarity. 
5. Plainville was located in a net deficit turkey producing area. 
6. Plainville was within a reasonable distance of the high populations  of New York 
City and New England markets. This would allow them to deliver fresh turkey 
which the national competitors may not be able to do. 
7. Others brought up by the class. 
Competitive disadvantages: 
1. Brand name recognition for Plainville was limited to a'very small geographic 
region. 
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2. Plainville did not have the market power to effectively compete with the national 
brands in an enlarged market. 
3. Plainville did not have the budget to compete with national competitors on 
promotional deals. 
a. Plainville did not have the resources to do serious research and development for 
new products. 
4. Others brought up by the class. 
Manufacturer,  Private  and  Mixed  Brands 
Manufacturer  brands 
Advantages: Several advantages were mentioned in the case which included: 
1. They allow the manufacturer to maintain control over the marketing strategy of a 
product line. This includes all decisions regarding promotion, pricing, and 
distri bution. 
2. They help control  image, thus differentiating a manufacturer from competition. 
3. A brand name makes it easier for the seller to process orders and track down 
problems. 
4. Seller's brand name and trademark provide legal protection of unique product 
features which would otherwise be copied by competitors. 
5. A brand name gives the seller the opportunity to attract a loyal a.Qd profitable set 
of customers. 
6. Good brand names help build corporate image. 
There were two very important reasons that were not mentioned in the case which 
should be discussed. They include: 
1. A brand name helps the seller segment markets. That is, the manufacturer can 
target specific segments of the market by positioning it's products to appeal to 
consumers in that segment. 
2. Brand loyalty gives sellers some protection from competition. 
3. In Plainville's case, it had experience in developing and merchandising brands. 
Disadvantages 
1. Manufacturer may be limited as to how to dispose of excess supply. 
2.  Brand work alone, may not utilize plant capacity fully. 
3. The manufacturers market area may be limited in size due to inability of 
manufacturer to promote and merchandise it's own brand. 
4. If there is ever a problem with the product or the corporation, this could severely 
hurt the firm if it operates with only one brand label. 
5. All distribution and promotional costs are the responsibility of the manufacturer. IPlainville Turkey Farm  Teaching Note I  22 
Private  Label  Brands 
Advantages: Most producers/manufacturers of turkey and turkey products engage 
in some degree of private label work. Manufacturers who engage in private labeling 
typically follow this approach when the retailer has a large number of outlets and a strong 
reputation. The advantages for a manufacturer of using a private label branding strategy 
include: 
1. Promotional costs are shifted to the retailer. 13 
2. Private label work provides the manufacturer with an outlet for excess product 
and a means to operate it's manufacturing facilities at  or close to full capacity. 
3. Private brands are typically lower priced than national brands and they appeal to 
budget conscious shoppers. 
4. They typically they get more prominent display space since a supennarket often 
gi ves it's own brands preference. 
5. Private label is generally more profitable (thus attractive for retailers). 
6. All product and image responsibility is the retailers'. 
Disadvantages 
1. The private label products produced by the manufacturer may compete directly 
with the manufacturer's own brand name. 
2. The manufacturer may lose some control over it's operations as a result of strong 
retailer influence. 
3. A manufacturer may not have the plant and/or personnel capacity to take on the 
addi tional work. 
Mixed  Branding 
Most producers/manufacturers engage in some degree of mixed branding. Some 
argue that this is attractive to them because it helps to segment their market and shifts some 
of their marketing costs to the retailer purchasing the private label products. Typically one 
segment is attracted to the manufacturers brand name while a different type of customer 
purchases private label brands so ideally, the two brands produced by a given manufacturer 
do not compete against each other, rather complement each other. 14 
Strategies  for  Growth 
Expansion of current market area 
One strategy for growth to consider might be for Plainville Turkey Fann to remain 
in the same market area but increase it's product line (e.g. chicken, beef, carrots?) and/or 
engage in pri vate label work. 
Expansion  into  new  market  areas 
Plainville Turkey Fann is a very successful closely held, family owned and 
operated business. It now faces the challenge of how to insure continued future growth. 
One obvious option is to extend their distribution area into downstate New York and 
13Berkowitz Eric N.,  Kerin Roger A.,  Rudelius William. Marketing. Irwin,  1989. 
p274. 
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perhaps New England since this area is a net deficit  turkey producing area  However, the 
major constraint Plainville Turkey Farm will face is the most likely loss of name brand 
recognition and stress on its hands-on management style. 
In order for Plainville to expand into the New York/New England market it would 
have to engage in one or more of the following activities: 
1. Differentiate it's products from the competition (e.g  .. ; fresh, value added). 
2., Advertise and promote it's products to build brand name awareness. 
3. Adopt cost saving technologies to bring it's costs down to allow them to more 
efficiently compete with existing brands in the market. 
4. Develop products and packaging to match market needs. REGIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT ~165 
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